On Information 'Decay'

The notion of information 'decay' is not accurate in the sense that information suffers any deformation in the process, but it poiints to the way in which what we are experiencing as information has its own temporality, which may also point to the ground of the way in which da-sein has its own temporality, in both cases more primordial than 'time' in the classical sense.

Prior to information having gone through the kind of change which indicates the entropy inherent in its temporality as in every other, information is the ground of possibility itself. As information passes into presentation, it becomes the ground of presentation and simultaneously the ground of what is presented.

Once presented information, in itself having suffered no deformation in its characterization as information, has been modified through presentation into imminent actuality as the presented and then becomes the ground of the extant, which as extant is always grounded in the past, i.e. in information that is no longer 'vital', having no further possibilities, since as ground of possibilities it has entropied temporally into the ground of what-already-is. Since the information itself has not seemingly suffered a change in its potential for representability, in terms of representation it appears to be supra-temporal. Classical time as derivative then is based on the representation of information, whereas primordial temporality, itself in a strong sense indistiguishable from primordial entropy, is based on the change in what given information grounds.

In terms of primal time, then, what is prior is information as the ground of possibility, since it is required that it be this ground prior to actualization in the event of presentation and extantness as representation. The apparent primacy of representation over presentation and possibility lies in the explanative focus of instrumentalism, as opposed to the focus on understanding operative in phenomenology.

As ground of possibility, the event of actualization and the representation of the extant, what is in this way experienced as 'information' is indistinguishable from what is experienced in the terms 'Being' and 'Nothing', the duality now envisioned from the arithmetical as the original 1 and 0 that grounds the basis of number itself as a binary entity. That entropy is effective in the ground itself is isomorphic to the proposal that Being is finite.

This would seem initially to reposit the "One", but in fact maintains that the 'One' is not, in the sense that the binary 1 and 0 are interdependent, in the same sense that Being and the Nothing are interdependent, in fact the notions are the same, 1 and 0 are the literal translations of Being and the Nothing from the English language into the language of binary arithmetic. The transcendental "One" of Plato, with all its isomorphs, has its transcendence in that it is the 'real' abstract, being only thinkable without isomorphs within the universe, when the universe retains its original meaning as "everything that is". And yet it also interchangeably retains its sense as origin of that "everything". The "One" is not, then, in a different sense to the way in which Being and the nothing "are not". Each "is not" in only having sense as ground of what is conceived as having being. Being and the Nothing, however experienced or interpreted, are the grounding multiple, represented in numerical form as the binary 0 and 1, in logic as identity and difference, instrumentally as information, and mathematically as the empty set.

The original ambiguity of what is intended variously by the notion of "Being" can be structured as differences of grounding in that different conceptions of "beingness" have a different groundedness. Where a particular entity is conceived of as "in being", what "is not" necessarily in order to ground such is also modified, the conceptions of beingness themselves are grounded in either the existential of understanding, or the activity of explanation, viz:

within understanding "beingness" refers to "having meaning" in the sense of a thing encounterable as what it is within-the-world by a being structured as world-opening by ecstatic ek-sistence.

within explanation (which always reaches into the past as origin and thus must represent) "beingness" would refer to "presentedness" without implication that presentation involves observation. The pastness of explanation's provence is the meaning of both undecidability and the 'observer effect' in the inability to represent what has not yet been presented.