A 'Scientific' Ethics?

The abstractions of science, not only within theory, but the objects of that theory, and the intepretations of the results of testing of those objects, whether via observation, experiment, survey, etc., are all initially abstracted on the basis of philosophical determinations of the things and the world from which they were abstracted. In turn these determinations always originate in a determinate philosophy, with specific assumptions, prejudices and tendencies. The more science declares its autonomy, the less visible these assumptions and prejudices become, and the less visible an assumption or prejudice, the more powerful its control. Consistency of result within a science based on such a determinate philosophy does not in any way guarantee the validity of the philosophy, as it is the predictable result of making the same assumptions at each moment of the scientific procedure.

As a result the sciences do ascertain correct concepts about the world and the things within it, but only in the manner that the philosophic base a priori considers valid. Nothing guarantees that these correct assertions are uniquely correct, complete, or even particularly important assertions about the things being studied. The validity of any science's results are strictly circumscribed within the conceptual framework to which it is indebted and of which it is incapable of questioning.

Within revealed religion, as based on the same metaphysical philosophy as the 'modern' sciences, the comparative complexity rendered necessary by the inability to leave meaning out, in the manner of the sciences, and by the inclusion of populist necessity of the inclusion of contradicting premetaphysical mythological tenets, creates a situation where the self consistency of the natural sciences, and thus their claim to a systematic connection to reality, is not obtainable. But given that the natural sciences rest on the same basic assumptions, the fundamental scientific claims cannot help but mimic the forms of the fundamental theological tenets. The 'One' haunts set theory, as that which presences only by absencing (the one as a set disappears under investigation into infinite divisibility into further multiples), in precisely the same manner that the holy ghost haunts the Christianity of anyone who takes the fundamental theological tenet "and god became man" combined with the death of that man with any seriousness. The origin of the universe in a singularity (the 'big bang' theory) makes the scientific posit of the universe's history a creationist account, whether that singularity itself has a further origin in a creator makes no difference whatsoever to the resulting account. It's not the case that American creationism is a Christianization of biology. It would be more accurate to say that it is a mythologization, in the sense of pre-conceptual, pre-metaphysical mythology, of the metaphysical/Christian biology that teaches evolution as a predestined, mechanistic causal set of temporally successive effects.

Science without philosophy has no basis in thought that could provide it with a means of abstraction necessary to its methodology. But philosophy contains far more than the basis of the natural sciences in terms of ontology, ethics and epistemology. A 'scientific ethic' is a worse round square than a Christian biology. The only potential effects of using 'modern' natural science as a basis for ethics are to either redouble the difficulty of questioning the assumptions and prejudices underlying ethics as they already exist, making those ethical assumptions that much more absolute and unquestionable, or negating ethics altogether via a reinterpretation of the base assumptions in light of a further assumption of predestination cloaked under a simplistic reduction of causality.